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NRS 7.085 allows a district court to make an attorney personally liable for the attorney 
fees and costs an opponent incurs when the attorney files, maintains or defends a civil action that 
is not well-grounded in fact or is not warranted by existing law or by a good faith argument for 
changing the existing law.2 The Court considered (1) whether NRCP 113 supersedes NRS 7.085 
in sanctioning a law firm and (2) whether the district court abused its discretion in sanctioning 
the law firm under under NRS 7.085. The Court held NRCP 11 does not supersede NRS § 7.085 
because each represents an independent method for sanctioning attorneys. The Court also found 
the district court abused its discretion in sanctioning the petitioner under NRS § 7.085 without 




In 2011, FortuNet, Inc. filed an initial complaint in the Eighth Judicial District Court 
alleging former employees breached duties and improperly used FortuNet’s intellectual property. 
FortuNet later retained petitioner, Watson Rounds, P.C. who filed a second amended complaint 
on behalf of FortuNet, adding Himelfarb & Associates, LLC, and its president, Bruce Himelfarb, 
as defendants. FortuNet’s claims against the newly named defendants alleged a kickback scheme 
and theft of FortuNet’s intellectual property.  
The district court dismissed several of FortuNet’s claims for lack of evidence under 
NRCP 50(a). Additionally, FortuNet voluntarily dismissed some of its claims against Himelfarb 
and Himelfarb & Associates. The rest of FortuNet’s claims made it to the jury. The jury rejected 
these remaining claims against Himelfarb and Himelfarb & Associates, found for Himelfarb and 
Himelfarb & Associates on its counterclaims, and asked the district court if it could include these 
defendants’ attorney’s fees when calculating damages. The district court instructed the jury it 
could not include attorney’s fees into its damages calculation because those fees would be 
assessed after the trial’s conclusion.  
The district court held FortuNet liable for Himelfarb’s attorney’s fees, totaling 
$551,216.38. Additionally, pursuant to NRS § 7.085, the district court found Watson was jointly 
and severally liable with FortuNet for the fees. The district court premised Watson’s liability on 
its determination that Watson maintained FortuNet’s claims against Himelfarb and Himelfarb & 
Associates, as well as defended FortuNet against Himelfarb and Himelfarb & Associate’s 
counterclaims, “despite not being well-grounded in fact and not warranted by existing law or 
good faith argument for a change in existing law.” 
Further, pursuant to NRS § 7.085, the district court sanctioned Watson “based on (1) its 
review of the various pre-trial motions, (2) the evidence presented at trial, (3) NRCP 50(a) 
rulings, (4) FortuNet’s voluntary dismissal with prejudice of certain claims, (5) the jury’s 
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2  See NEV. REV. STAT. § 7.085 (1995).  
3  NEV. R. CIV. P. 11. 
unanimous verdict in favor of [Himelfarb], (6) the jury’s expressed desire to award [Himelfarb 
its] entire attorney’s fees incurred relating to this case,” (7) the testimony of FortuNet’s CEO and 
principal witness, who stated Watson “was responsible for 99.99% of the factual and legal 
content of FortuNet’s pleadings,” and (8) the district court’s determination “that Watson could 
not have made the required inquiries . . . [and] could not have reassessed the evidentiary support 
for FortuNet’s claims before filing [the second amended complaint] . . . and could not have had a 




 Watson sought a writ of mandamus vacating the district court’s order making it liable for 
Himelfarb’s and Himelfarb & Associate’s attorney’s fees. Watson argued (1) the court should 
exercise its discretion to consider Watson’s petition; (2) NRCP 11 supersedes NRS § 7.085, 
making the district court’s award improper; and (3) the district court abused its discretion when it 
made Watson liable for Himelfarb’s and Himelfarb & Associate’s attorney’s fees without first 
making adequate findings. 
 
This court will exercise its discretion to consider Watson’s petition 
 
 The Court has discretion to issue extraordinary writs.4 The Court generally exercises this 
discretion when a party does not have a plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law. Where a party 
is able to appeal a final judgment in the future, the party generally has an adequate and speedy 
legal remedy, which precludes writ relief.5 However, a sanctioned attorney lacks standing to 
appeal because the attorney is not a party in the underlying action, which makes writs the proper 
avenue for an attorney seeking sanction review.6 Here, Watson was not a party to the underlying 
action and cannot appeal the district court’s order. This entitled Watson to seek a writ of 
mandamus.  
 
NRCP 11 does not supersede NRS 7.085 
 
 Watson argued that, because NRS § 7.085 is a statute that was last amended in 2003 and 
NRCP 11 is a procedural rule that was last amended in 2004, NRCP 11 supersedes NRS § 7.085, 
or, alternatively, NRS § 7.085 now incorporates NRCP 11’s safe harbor provisions. NRCP 11’s 
2004 amendment added safe harbor provisions preventing attorneys from being sanctioned until 
they are able to cure the sanctionable conduct or appear at a show cause hearing. Watson relied 
on State v. Connery for this argument.7 There, the Court addressed whether a statute or a later-
enacted appellate rule governed time for an appeal. 8  The rule and statute in Connery were 
irreconcilable because each provided different start dates to calculated a thirty-day window for 
appeal. 9  The Court held the procedural rule superseded the statute. 10  Here, the Court 
                                                        
4  MountainView Hosp., Inc. v. Eight. Jud. Dist. Ct., 128 Nev. Adv. Op. 17, 273 P.3d 861, 864 (Apr. 5, 2012). 
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distinguished Connery from Watson’s case because Watson did not provide any justification as 
to why NRCP 11 and NRS § 7.085 could not be read in harmony. 
 The Court next looked to federal authority for indication that NRCP 11 does not 
supersede NRS § 7.085. Nevada adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in their entirety in 
1993. The 1993 Advisory Committee Notes provide that FRCP 11 does not supersede 28 USC § 
1927, a statute that “makes attorneys personally liable for the unreasonable and vexatious 
multiplication of proceedings.” Further, federal courts recognize that FRCP 11 and § 1927 
“apply to different types of misconduct and provide independent mechanisms for sanctioning 
attorney conduct.” Following this line of reasoning, the Court found the relationship between 
NRCP 11 and NRS § 7.085 comparable to the relationship between FRCP 11 and § 1927.  
 Lastly, the Court looked to Nevada’s statutory interpretation rules to support its 
conclusion that NRCP 11 does not supersede NRS § 7.085. A court will read a rule or statute in 
harmony with other rules or statutes whenever possible.11 Therefore, the Court found that NRCP 
11 does not supersede NRS § 7.085 because it appropriate to “treat the rule and statute as 
independent methods for district courts to award attorneys fees for misconduct.”  
  
The district court failed to make adequate findings supporting sanctions against Watson 
 
 The Court held the district court’s findings were insufficient to support a conclusion that 
Watson violated NRS § 7.085. First, it was improper for the district court to rely on the jury’s 
question about awarding attorney’s fees for FortuNet’s breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. NRS § 7.085 does not empower juries to sanction attorneys and there is no 
authority indicating Watson could be liable for damages resulting from its client’s breach. 
Second, the district court’s order contains several conclusions unsupported by sufficient factual 
detail and reasoning, making it impossible to meaningfully review the sanctions. Third, “it is not 
clear the NRCP 50(a) rulings and FortuNet’s voluntary dismissal of some claims support an 
award for attorney fees.” Lastly, FortuNet’s CEO’s testimony does not explain why the award 
against Watson is justified. This evidence blames Watson for “any groundlessness that might 
have existed,” but does not say anything about whether the claims were well grounded in fact or 




The Court exercised its discretion to hear Watson’s writ petition because, as a nonparty to 
the underlying action, Watson is unable to appeal the district court’s order. NRCP 11 does not 
supersede NRS § 7.085 because they are distinct mechanisms for sanctioning attorney 
misconduct. The district court abused its discretion in sanctioning Watson pursuant to NRS § 
7.085 because its order did not sufficiently explain why Watson should be liable for attorney 
fees. The Court ordered the clerk to issue a writ of mandamus instructing the district court to 
vacate the portion of its order holding Watson jointly and severally liable for attorney fees and 
costs. 
                                                        
11  Nev. Power Co. v. Haggerty, 115 Nev. 353, 364, 989 P.2d 870, 877 (1999); see also Bowyer v. Taack, 107 Nev. 
625, 627–28, 817 P.2d 1176, 1178 (1991). 
